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COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. Romeo'
(decided Feb. 11, 2009)
While imprisoned in Canada, Anthony Romeo was extradited
to the United States pursuant to the Canada-United States Extradition
Treaty ("Treaty") and arraigned in a Suffolk County court nineteen
years after the same court indicted him for murder.2 He pleaded
guilty to manslaughter in the first degree, and was sentenced to seven
to twenty-one years imprisonment.3 Romeo appealed his conviction
claiming that his constitutional4 and statutory5 right to a speedy trial
was violated by the lengthy duration of the indictment. 6 The Appel-
late Division, Second Department, agreed with Romeo, "reversed
[his] conviction and dismissed the indictment . . . ."' Subsequently,
the government appealed and the New York Court of Appeals applied
a five factor speedy trial test that was espoused in People v. Tarano-
vich8 to evaluate whether an individual's constitutional right to a
speedy trial has been violated. 9 Ultimately, the New York Court of
Appeals concluded that the government's delay in prosecution vi-
olated Romeo's right to a speedy trial.'o
Nearly one year after a fatal shooting at a Suffolk County res-
idence in November 1985, ballistics evidence matched the murder
904 N.E.2d 802 (N.Y. 2009).
2 Id. at 805.
3 Id.
4 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI, states, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to a speedy ... trial . . . ."
5 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.20 (1) (McKinney 2009) provides: "After a criminal action
is commenced, the defendant is entitled to a speedy trial." See also N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW §
12 (McKinney 2009) ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused has a right to a speedy ...
trial.").
6 Romeo, 904 N.E.2d at 805.
Id.
335 N.E.2d 303, 306 (N.Y. 1975).
9 Romeo, 904 N.E.2d at 805-06.
10 Id. at 808.
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weapon to a firearm belonging to Romeo." In February 1987, Ro-
meo was ordered by a Suffolk County court to provide a deoxyribo-
nucleic acid ("DNA") sample for the authorities to compare with evi-
dence from the murder.12  However, two days before he was
scheduled to surrender to authorities and provide the DNA sample, he
fled to Canada where he subsequently killed a police officer who
pulled him over for speeding.13 Romeo then "reentered the United
States" and was arrested "at Logan International Airport" in Boston.14
After his arrest, Romeo was held in federal custody without
bail while he was arraigned on a Canadian warrant and awaited
extradition to Canada.' 5 While he was in custody, Suffolk County
law enforcement authorities traveled to Boston to obtain a DNA sam-
ple from him.16 The DNA sample matched physical evidence from
the 1985 murder.'7 On March 27, 1987, "a Suffolk County grand
jury indicted [Romeo] on two counts of murder in the second degree
. . ."18 Following the indictment, Suffolk County prosecutors re-
quested that he remain in the United States. '9 On April 1, Romeo in-
voked his constitutional right to a speedy trial and formally requested
that he be immediately arraigned and tried.20 On May 15, Canadian
officials sent a letter to Suffolk County authorities stating that the
Treaty allowed Romeo to be returned to the United States for his trial
on the American murder indictment even after a conviction in Cana-
da. 2 1 Although the tone of the letter was encouraging, it did not ex-
plicitly assure that Romeo's return would be expeditious.22
On May 29, Romeo "filed an order to show cause in Suffolk
County court demanding a writ of habeas corpus . . . be produced for
arraignment .. 23 Under the belief-albeit mistaken-that he
' Id. at 804.
12 Id.
13 Id.




18 Id. (citation omitted). At the time that the grand jury indicted Romeo, he was still in
federal custody. Romeo, 904 N.E.2d at 804.




23 Romeo, 904 N.E.2d at 804-05.
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would be promptly returned to the United States after the Canadian
trial, the government argued that there would be no unusual delay in
waiting to prosecute Romeo after his Canadian trial.24 The Suffolk
County court denied Romeo's petition, which allowed the govern-
ment to defer its prosecution until after he was tried in Canada.25
However, the court cautioned that any delay caused by allowing him
to be first returned to Canada could violate his right to a speedy tri-
al.26 Despite this warning, the government chose to defer Romeo's
27prosecution. Subsequently, Romeo was extradited to Canada where
he was convicted of murder and sentenced to twenty-five years im-
prisonment.28 Following his Canadian conviction, Suffolk County
authorities never requested that he be extradited back to the United
States to face the American murder charges. 29
In 1999, twelve years after being indicted on the Suffolk
County murder charge, Romeo moved to dismiss the indictment
claiming that his constitutionalo and statutory31 right to a speedy trial
were violated.32 His motion was denied.33 In 2005, "following
amendments to the . .. Treaty that allowed for the 'borrowing' of de-
fendant[s] from Canada," Romeo was extradited to the United States
and arraigned. 34 In February 2006 Romeo pleaded guilty "to man-
slaughter in the first degree and was sentenced to a term of impri-
sonment of [seven] to [twenty-one] years to be served concurrently
with [his] Canadian sentence."35
Romeo appealed and argued that his right to a speedy trial
was violated by the nineteen-year delay after the initial indictment.3 6
The Appellate Division, Second Department, considered the govern-
ment's twelve-year delay from 1987 until Romeo filed a motion al-




28 Romeo, 904 N.E.2d at 805.
29 id.
30 Id.; U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
31 Romeo, 904 N.E.2d at 805; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.20 (1) (McKinney 2009); N.Y.
Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 12 (McKinney 2009).
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leging the constitutional violation in 1999 and reversed his convic-
tion, because "the [government's] delay violated the defendant's right
to a speedy trial." 37 The court reasoned that the delay was caused by
the government's decision to defer prosecution until after Romeo was
prosecuted in Canada and its subsequent failure to request extradition
to the United States despite the uncertainty over whether the request
would be granted.
The New York Court of Appeals agreed to hear the govern-
ments appeal and subsequently affirmed the appellate division's deci-
sion.39 In reaching its conclusion, the court applied a five factor
speedy trial test, which includes the following: "(1) the extent of the
delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the nature of the underlying
charges; (4) any extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) any
impairment of defendant's defense." 4 0 No one factor is dispositive of
whether a violation has occurred; each must be balanced in the con-
text of the circumstances of the case.4'
The court began its analysis with the first factor, a lengthy de-
lay.42 It stated that "the extent of the delay[] is of critical importance
because 'all other factors being equal, the greater the delay the more
probable it is that the accused will be harmed thereby.' "43 However,
the court recognized that no specific period of time creates a pre-
sumption of prejudice.4 4 A lengthy delay triggers the examination of
the other factors, itself becoming one of those factors.45 Applying
this analysis to Romeo's case, the court concluded that the "delay be-
tween the indictment and the filing of the speedy trial motion was an
extraordinary period of [twelve] years," which was sufficient to trig-
ger a rigorous examination of the remaining factors.46
The court also noted that the lengthy delay in Romeo's case
3 Romeo, 904 N.E.2d at 805.
38 id.
40 Id. at 805-06 (citation omitted).
41 Id. at 806.
42 Romeo, 904 N.E.2d at 806.
43 Id. (quoting People v. Taranovich, 335 N.E.2d 303, 306 (N.Y. 1975)).
4 Id See also Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1992) ("Simply to trigger
a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial
has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from 'presumptively prejudicial' delay . .)
(citation omitted).
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required increased scrutiny of the second factor, the reason for the de-
lay.47 It found the government's decision to defer prosecution until
after Romeo was tried in Canada and its failure to request his extradi-
tion to the United States as the reasons for the delay.48 If Romeo's
extradition had been requested and granted, the delay may have been
diminished.49 In making its determination, the court placed signifi-
cant emphasis on the warning given by the trial court to the govern-
ment that deferring prosecution risked a violation of Romeo's right to
a speedy trial.so Furthermore, the court emphasized that despite Ro-
meo's repeated requests to be arraigned before his extradition to Can-
ada and claim of prejudice by the delay that already had occurred, the
government still chose to defer his arraignment until after he was
tried in Canada.'
The government argued that its decision to delay prosecution
was justified because of the communications it received from Cana-
dian authorities.52 The court rejected this argument by noting that
even if the government acted under a mistaken belief that Romeo
could be extradited to the United States immediately following his
Canadian trial, "the [government] still knew or should have known
that there was no guarantee that [Romeo] would be brought back to
Suffolk County in a timely manner." 53 Moreover, it reasoned that the
Treaty gives Canadian authorities discretion in determining whether
to grant extradition or wait until after the individual serves his term of
imprisonment.5 4 The government, "at the very minimum," is re-
quired to make the extradition request; instead, its lack of an attempt
to extradite him or try him before his extradition to Canada risked vi-
olating his right to a speedy trial. The court ended its analysis of
the second factor by concluding that:
The fact that a defendant is incarcerated outside of the








54 Id. at 806-07.
ss Romeo, 904 N.E.2d at 807.
2010]1 911
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make diligent, good faith efforts to secure his presence
in the state for arraignment and trial. Where the de-
fendant is incarcerated in another country, failing to
make an extradition request has been one factor that
courts have viewed as evidencing a lack of diligent ef-
forts on the part of the prosecution in bringing [the]
defendant to trial promptly.56
The government's obligation to request extradition is only re-
lieved where the foreign jurisdiction has manifested an intent to deny
the request.5 ' However, the court noted that the record contained no
indication that Canadian authorities would have denied an extradition
request.5 8 Thus, the government was not relieved of its obligation to
make a good faith attempt to bring Romeo to trial by requesting
extradition. 59
The court then assessed the third factor, the nature of the un-
derlying charges. 60 Although Romeo was charged with murder, the
court emphasized that the serious nature of such a charge "does not
trump a defendant's right to a speedy trial." 6 1 However, pointing to
its opinion in Taranovich, the court noted that the nature of the of-
fense may have a bearing on the reasonableness of the length of the
prosecutor's delay in trying the case because of his desire to be tho-
roughly prepared for trial.62 In this case, however, the government
did not claim that the delay was due to a need for such preparation.63
Instead, the court found that the delay was solely a result of Romeo's
imprisonment in Canada.64
Next, the court determined that the fourth factor, the length of
any pretrial incarceration, was not significant as applied to Romeo.65
56 Id (citations omitted).
s7 Id ("[W]here the foreign country demonstrates its clear intention to deny an extradition
request, the [government is] under no obligation to make a futile gesture.").
58 id.
59 Id
6o Romeo, 904 N.E.2d at 807.
61 Id. (emphasis added).
62 Id. See also Taranovich, 335 N.E.2d at 306 (noting that the "right to a speedy trial is
[not] dependent upon what one is charged with").





Touro Law Review, Vol. 26 [2010], No. 3, Art. 18
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol26/iss3/18
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL
Indeed, Romeo was initially incarcerated on the Canadian warrant
and subsequently held only on the Canadian charges.66 He was never
held solely on the charges resulting from his conduct in Suffolk
County, and he did not face any "additional incarceration from those
charges" during his prosecution.67
Under the fifth factor, the impairment of the defense by the
delay, the court found that it was "highly likely" that Romeo's de-
fense was negatively affected.6 8  The court explained that the im-
pairment stems from his incarceration abroad, which made it arduous
for Romeo to engage "in his own defense, confer with counsel and
contact witnesses." 69 Additionally, Romeo claimed that he had psy-
chiatric problems; therefore, he may have asserted a defense of men-
tal defect, which would have required him to establish such defect at
the time of the murder.70  His incarceration in Canada, however,
clearly affected his ability to plead or establish this affirmative de-
fense.n
After analyzing the five Taranovich factors, the court con-
cluded that the appellate division correctly applied them in making its
determination. 72 Thus, the prejudice caused by the government's de-
cision to defer prosecution until after Romeo's trial in Canada and its
subsequent failure to request extradition "violated [Romeo's] consti-
tutional right to a speedy trial."73
The United States Supreme Court has declared that "[t]he his-
tory of the right to a speedy trial and its reception in this country
clearly establish that it is one of the most basic rights preserved by
our Constitution." 74 In Barker v. Wingo,75 the Court fashioned a four
factor balancing test to determine whether a defendant's right to a
speedy trial is violated.7 6 The remedy for a violation of a criminal
66 Id.
67 id.
68 Romeo, 904 N.E.2d at 807.
69 Id. at 807-08.
70 Id. at 808.
71 Id.
72 id.
7 Romeo, 904 N.E.2d at 808.
74 Klopfer v. State, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967).
7 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
76 Id. at 530.
2010] 913
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defendant's speedy trial right is a "dismissal of the indictment."77
The first factor espoused by the Barker court is "[t]he length
of the delay" in prosecution. 78 The Court identified this factor as ana-
logous to a "triggering mechanism," 79 because an evaluation of the
other factors is not necessary until the delay is found to be "presump-
tively prejudicial." 0 In turn, the length of the delay must be eva-
luated in the midst of all of the circumstances of a case to determine
whether prejudice is presumed.8' For example, it would be reasona-
ble to expect a greater delay for more serious or complex crimes than
minor crimes because of the prosecutor's desire to be more fully pre-
pared for his case.82
The second factor, closely related to the first, is the govern-
ment's reason for the delay.83 The Court emphasized that the weight
given to this factor depends upon the specific reason the government
provides for the delay.84 For example, the factor "should be weighted
heavily against the government" if it delays prosecution merely to
handicap the defense, while neutral reasons, such as the overcrowd-
ing of court dockets or negligence, should be given less weight.
Lastly, delay may be entirely appropriate for valid reasons, "such as a
missing witness."86
The third factor is whether, and if so, how, the defendant has
claimed that his right to a speedy trial has been violated.8 7 This fac-
tor is also heavily intertwined with the length of the delay and the
amount of prejudice caused by the delay; for instance, the longer the
delay and the stronger the prejudice, the more likely the defendant is
to claim that his right to a speedy trial has been violated. While a
defendant does not waive his right to a speedy trial by failing to file a
claim, the assertion by the defendant that the right has been violated
n Id. at 522.
78 Id. at 530.
7 Id.
80 Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.
"8 Id. at 530-31.
82 Id. at 531 ("[T]he delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably
less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.").
83 id.
84 Id ("[D]ifferent weights should be assigned to different reasons.").
8 Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
86 Id
87 Id(
88 Id ("The more serious the deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to complain.").
914 [Vol. 26
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"is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the
defendant is being deprived of the right." 89 Furthermore, the "failure
to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove he
was denied a speedy trial." 90
Lastly, the prejudice suffered by the defendant must be ba-
lanced with the other factors.91 According to the Court, "[p]rejudice
... should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants
which the speedy trial right was designed to protect." 92 The first two
interests that the Barker court identified include "prevent[ing] op-
pressive pretrial incarceration" and "minimiz[ing the] anxiety and
concern of the accused."93 Lengthy pretrial incarceration can deprive
the defendant of a job, time spent with family, and the ability to assist
in his defense while at the same time encouraging "idleness" because
of the lack of rehabilitative and recreational programs in prison. 94
These are serious consequences for an individual who has not even
been tried, especially "those persons who are ultimately found to be
innocent." 95 Moreover, even if the defendant is not incarcerated, his
liberty is still restrained by the cloud of suspicion that is cast upon
him by society.96 The third and last interest the Court identified is
"limit[ing] the possibility that the defense will be impaired." 97 This
is the most serious interest, because the notion of fairness is violated
if the defense cannot sufficiently prepare its case.98 For example, a
lengthy delay risks the unavailability of witnesses or the inability to
recall events.99
The Court has also held that the government must make a "di-
ligent, good-faith effort to" arrange for the defendant's presence at an
arraignment and trial when he is incarcerated in a different state than
the one where criminal charges are pending. 00 In Smith v. Hooey,
' Id. at 531-32.





95 Barker, 407 U.S. at 533.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 532 (footnote omitted).
98 Id. ("[Tihe inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of
the entire system.").
9 Id.
1oo Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 383 (1969).
2010] 915
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the Court examined the question of the state's obligation to pursue
prosecution against a defendant facing state criminal charges when
that defendant is imprisoned in another jurisdiction.'o' In that case,
the defendant was indicted in Texas for theft while he was serving a
sentence at a federal prison in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 10 2 After
the State of Texas filed charges against him, the defendant "mailed a
letter [from Kansas] to the Texas trial court requesting a speedy tri-
al."' 03 He was told that the trial would take place "within two weeks
of any date . . . [in] which he could be present."1 0 4 For the next six
years the defendant continued to request, by letter, that "he be
brought to trial." 0 5 However, the State of Texas took no action to
secure the defendant's presence in order for the case to be tried.106
Finally, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charges against
him based on the government's neglect to prosecute.107  He then
commenced "a mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court of Tex-
as," requesting cause be shown why the charges against him "should
not be dismissed."10 8 The Supreme Court of Texas refused to issue
the writ, and the defendant sought and was granted certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court.109
The Court reaffirmed the three underlying interests of the
right to a speedy trial and emphasized how they embody what the
guarantee of the right to a speedy trial is intended to protect."o It
noted that, at first glance, it seems an individual already serving time
in prison cannot suffer "oppressive incarceration prior to trial.""1
However, that individual may nevertheless suffer as much oppression
as an individual who is held pretrial without bail.1 2 First, if the de-
fendant was tried sooner, it is possible that he could receive a sen-
tence to be served concurrently with the sentence he is already serv-
o' Id. at 375.
102 Id
103 id.
104 Id (internal quotations omitted) (footnote omitted).




109 Id at 375-76.
110 Smith, 393 U.S. at 377-78.
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ing.11 3 This opportunity would be lost if there was a lengthy delay in
prosecution. 114 Additionally, it is not uncommon for sentences al-
ready being served to be increased and the conditions the defendant
faces in prison to be worsened when another criminal charge is
brought against him.1"s
The Smith Court then examined the second interest and noted
that while it may be argued that a defendant who is already impri-
soned is less likely to be affected by anxiety and public stigma by
awaiting prosecution, there may still be an oppressive effect on
him." 6 The anxiety and fear can interfere with efforts to rehabilitate
the defendant because he will have little incentive for "self-
improvement."" 7
Lastly, the Court examined the third interest, the ability to as-
sist in one's defense, and recognized that such a right generally re-
mains unaffected because the defendant is already incarcerated."'
However, the likelihood that this right is impaired is greatly increased
when the defendant is incarcerated in a different state than the one
where the charges are pending.119 The defendant who is confined to a
cell and located far away from the location of the pending charges
may have great difficulty in conferring with and keeping track of
witnesses.1 20 Moreover, the already incarcerated defendant is "po-
werless to exert his own investigative efforts to mitigate the[] erosive
effects of the passage of time," such as the disappearance of evidence
and witnesses.121
The Court then noted that the State of Texas made no effort to
request a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequenduml 22 from the Federal
Bureau of Prisons, which would have granted the defendant's re-
113 Id.
114 Id. at 378.
115 Smith, 393 U.S. at 378.
116 Id. at 379.
117 Id (internal quotations omitted) (footnote omitted).
118 id.
119 Id
120 Smith, 393 U.S. at 379-80.
121 Id. at 380.
122 See Leslie W. Abramson, The Interstate Agreement ofDetainers: Narrowing its Avail-
ability and Applications, 21 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 7 (1995) ("A writ
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quest.123 In fact, the state made no effort to bring the defendant to
justice at all, except for learning that he was serving time in federal
prison.124 The fact that federal authorities had discretion to release
the defendant into the custody of the state made no difference.125 in-
deed, " 'the possibility of a refusal is not the equivalent of asking and
receiving a rebuff.' ,26 Thus, the Court concluded that the state
"ha[s] a constitutional duty to make a diligent, good-faith effort to
bring" a defendant before the court for trial when a speedy trial is
demanded. 127
Several circuit courts of appeals have applied the holding in
Hooey to defendants who are incarcerated in another country.128 For
example, in United States v. Corona- Verbera, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals addressed the question of whether a defendant's
right to a speedy trial is violated when there is an eight-year delay be-
tween arrest and indictment. 129  After being indicted for "drug
crimes" in May 1990, "a warrant was issued for [Corona-Verbera's]
arrest."l 30 In August 2001, a federal grand jury returned an indict-
ment against him that superceded another indictment returned in
1995.' ' He "was arrested in Mexico pursuant to a provisional arrest
warrant on January 23, 2003," and Mexico granted the United States'
extradition request in March of that year.132 Corona-Verbera first ap-
peared in court in 2004, and after requesting several continuances, he
filed a motion alleging that his right to a speedy trial had been vi-
olated. 133  His motion was denied and he was subsequently found
guilty after his trial in 2006.134 His sentence was credited with time
123 Smith, 393 U.S. at 380-81.
124 Id at 381.
125 Id at 382.
126 Id (quoting Barber v. Page, 381 F.2d 479, 481 (10th Cir. 1966) (Aldrich, J., dissent-
ing)).
127 Id. at 383.
128 See, e.g., United States v. Corona-Verbera, 509 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007) (hold-
ing an "eight-year delay between indictment and arrest . . . presumptively prejudicial");
United States v. Blanco, 861 F.2d 773, 778 (2d Cir. 1988) ("[T]he government has a consti-
tutional duty to make a diligent, good faith effort to bring a defendant to trial promptly.")
(citations omitted).
129 Corona- Verbera, 509 F.3d at 1114.
130 Id at 1111.
132 id
113 Id. at 1112.
134 Corona- Verbera, 509 F.3d at 1112.
918 [Vol. 26
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he spent incarcerated in Mexico.135
The Seventh Circuit began its speedy trial analysis by empha-
sizing that once the defendant requests a trial, the government is obli-
gated to " 'make a diligent, good faith effort to' " secure the defen-
dant's presence for trial.136  The court then weighed the Barker
factors and determined "that the near[] eight-year delay between [the
defendant's] indictment and arrest [was] presumptively prejudicial
and sufficient to trigger inquiry into the other three factors."1 37 Next,
it adopted the approach taken by the Second Circuit that when the
government, in good faith, believes that a request for extradition
would be futile, it is under no obligation to exercise due diligence in
making such a request. ' In support of its case, the government of-
fered evidence that Mexico extradited very few, if any, Mexican citi-
zens on narcotics charges prior to 2002.139 Thus, any efforts to extra-
dite the defendant prior to that period "would have been futile." 40
The court found that the government did exercise due diligence when
it entered the defendant's name in the National Crime Information
Center ("NCIC") database in 1990 and when it updated the NCIC da-
tabase and border computer system to note that the 1995 indictment
was returned.141 Moreover, in an attempt to help locate the defendant
and execute the arrest warrant "the government contacted Unsolved
Mysteries and America's Most Wanted." 42 Unsolved Mysteries ran
a segment on the defendant "twenty times between 1991 and 1997,
and at least once in Mexico in 2000 or 2001," while America's Most
Wanted aired a segment in 1996.143 After an agent received a tip in
2002 of Corona-Verbera's location, he "was extradited in 2003."l44
Moreover, the court recognized that the defendant only
claimed a violation of his speedy trial right after he requested eight
136 Id. at 1114 (quoting United States v. Sandoval, 990 F.2d 481, 484 (9th Cir. 1993)).
137 Id.
138 Id. See also Blanco, 861 F.2d at 778 ("Due diligence does not require the government
to pursue goals that are futile.") (citation omitted).
139 Corona- Verbera, 509 F.3d at 1114-15.




'" Corona-Verbera, 509 F.3d at 1115.
2010] 919
13
Rowley: Court of Appeals of New York - People v. Romeo
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2010
TOURO LAWREVIEW
continuances. 145  The court found that the eight requests did not
weigh in favor of either the government or dismissal of the indict-
ment.146 It then noted that if the government pursues a defendant
with due diligence, the defendant must "show 'specific prejudice to
his defense.' ,"47 The court concluded that Corona-Verbera did not
prove actual prejudice, and thus weighted the factors in favor of the
government because they pursued the defendant with due dili-
gence. 148
In New York, the right to a speedy trial is guaranteed not by
the state constitution, but by statute.149 In People v. Taranovich, the
New York Court of Appeals fashioned a five-factor test for determin-
ing whether a speedy trial violation has occurred. 5 0 The five factors
include: "(1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3)
the nature of the underlying charge; (4) whether .. . there has been an
extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5) whether ... there is
any indication that the defense has been impaired by reason of the de-
lay." 5 1 No factor or combination of factors is completely determina-
tive of whether a violation has in fact occurred.152 Prior to this test,
the court evaluated a speedy trial claim under only two factors, the
length of the delay and the reason for the delay.15 3
The court noted that the first factor, the length of delay, is
perhaps the most important factor because the greater the delay the
more likely the defendant is prejudiced if all of the other factors are
given equal weight.154 However, there is no per se time period after
"which a criminal prosecution may not be pursued."155  Under the
second factor, the court noted that a mistake, such as a clerical error,
is not sufficient on its own to warrant a finding of a violation.156 Un-
der the third factor, it stated that a more serious charge could warrant
145 Id. at 1116.
146 id
147 Id (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656).
148
149 Taranovich, 335 N.E.3d at 305.
"s0 Id. at 306.
151 Id
152 Id. at 305.
'" Id. at 307 (Wachtler, J., dissenting).
154 Taranovich, 335 N.E.2d at 306.
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an expectation of a lengthier time period in between indictment and
trial because of the prosecutor's desire to prepare for trial in a greater
fashion.' The court placed great significance on the fourth factor
because the right to a speedy trial is intended as a safeguard against
lengthy pretrial incarceration.15 8 Defendants can be severely disad-
vantaged by prolonged pretrial incarceration because it can hamper
their ability to participate and assist in their defense.' 59 Lastly, under
the fifth factor, the court noted that while defendants need not show
they were prejudiced by the delay, the reasonableness of a period of
time may depend upon the likelihood that an acquittal would have
been affected.160 However, prejudice will be presumed without any
proof where the delay is great enough.161
The federal and New York standards make it clear that an in-
carcerated defendant located in a different jurisdiction is not to be
stripped away of his right to claim a speedy trial violation. 162 Even
while the defendant is serving a sentence for a conviction in a foreign
country, the government has an obligation to make reasonable efforts
to bring him to trial on the pending charges.163 Furthermore, when
determining whether a delay is reasonable, the court may take into
account the nature of the underlying charges and the amount of pre-
judice the defense has suffered.164
However, the two standards have one fundamental difference:
whether the court should consider any declarations by the defendant
demanding a right to a speedy trial in making its speedy trial viola-
tion analysis.165 While a defendant is not deemed to have waived his
right to a speedy trial by failing to make a demand, federal courts
give "strong evidentiary weight" to how frequently, if at all, a defen-
dant asserts his right to a speedy trial.166 On the other hand, New
15 id.
158 Id. ("Historically, this factor has been considered significant because the speedy trial
guarantee affords the accused a safeguard against prolonged imprisonment prior to the com-
mencement . . . of his trial.") (citation omitted).
' Taranovich, 335 N.E.2d at 306.
160 Id at 306-7.
161 id
162 See Hooey, 393 U.S. at 383; Romeo, 904 N.E.2d at 808.
161 Hooey, 393 U.S. at 383; Romeo, 904 N.E.2d at 807.
'6 Barker, 407 U.S. at 530; Romeo, 904 N.E.2d at 806-07.
161 See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530; Romeo, 904 N.E.2d at 806-07.
166 Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32.
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York courts do not consider how many times a defendant makes the
assertion for a speedy trial.167
A defendant should not be required to request a speedy trial
before asserting his rights because it is the duty of the government to
provide a speedy trial.16 1 Considering defendants' zeal in asserting
their right ignores the practical realities that many incarcerated de-
fendants already face. Defendants incarcerated in foreign jurisdic-
tions may be subject to extremely limited access to counsel or may be
denied access altogether. 169 They may also have a limited or nonexis-
tent right to communicate with those outside of the foreign prison, or
may have limited access to legal materials that would allow them to
assert their rights in the American jurisdiction. 7 0 Indeed, courts have
already recognized these potential pitfalls, declaring that "[c]learly
there can be no waiver of the right to speedy trial where the defen-
dant . . . is powerless to assert his right because of imprisonment, ig-
norance and lack of legal advice."17 ' Furthermore, there may also be
a greater likelihood that the defendant is unaware of the pending
charges against him in the American jurisdiction. 172 Finally, any as-
sertion by the defendant of his right to a speedy trial may be fruitless
if he is in a jurisdiction that does not have an extradition agreement
with the United States.173
The New York standard, therefore, offers greater protection to
the accused who are already serving a sentence for a conviction in a
167 See Taranovich, 335 N.E.2d at 306.
168 See Shafer v. State, 183 N.E. 774, 775 (Ohio Ct. App. 1932), overruled by State v.
Doyle, 228 N.E.2d 863, 867 (Ohio 1967) (holding that a defendant is not required to have
requested a speedy trial before claiming a violation of that right).
169 Shan-san Wu, The Atkins Zone, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC ADVENTURE MAG., Dec. 2003/Jan.
2004, available at http://www.nationalgeographic.com/adventure/0312/exclusive.html (not-
ing that "[a]ccess to legal counsel during interrogation and trial is not guaranteed" in Saudi
Arabia and that "it is extremely difficult to contact people who are in Chinese jails").
170 id.
171 See United States v. Reed, 285 F. Supp. 738, 741 (D.D.C. 1968) (footnote omitted).
See also Coleman v. United States, 442 F.2d 150, 156-57 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (finding that the
lower court erred by finding a waiver of the right where there was "no basis for assuming
that [the defendant] had either the ability or the information on which to make an intelligent
and voluntary waiver of his right to a speedy trial") (footnotes omitted).
172 See Taylor v. United States, 238 F.2d 259, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (finding that there can
be no waiver of the right to a speedy trial where the defendant did not "kn[o]w he was in-
dicted and entitled to a trial").
173 Wu, supra note 169 (noting that India and China do not have "prisoner transfer agree-
ment[s]" with the United States).
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foreign jurisdiction. Under speedy trial jurisprudence, the burden is
upon the government to bring an accused individual to justice.17 4
This burden is especially important where a defendant is being held
in a foreign jurisdiction, because the government is required to make
diligent and reasonable efforts to produce him for trial in the Ameri-
can jurisdiction.'7 5 In the context of these strong burdens upon the
government, it is inappropriate to give weight to whether the defen-
dant has demanded a speedy trial. Lastly, the "failure to assert the
right" should not "make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he
was denied a speedy trial." 76 The circumstances a defendant faces in
a foreign prison may hinder his ability to assert his rights, which
should not be weighed against him.
Allison L. Rowley
174 Barker, 407 U.S. at 529 ("[T]he rule we announce today ... places the primary burden
on the courts and the prosecutors to assure that cases are brought to trial.").
171 Hooey, 393 U.S. at 383.
176 Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
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